The Pak-US Strategic Dialogue is taking place only because everyone, including Uncle Sam, knows that the US interest in Pakistan is mainly because of its own major problems in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is central to any solution in the long-suffering country, the US recognises that Pakistan’s stability and well-being is vital for peace and prosperity in Afghanistan.
Gen David Petraeus’ predecessor, Gen Stanley McChrystal, recognised that all ethnicities, particularly the Pashtuns, had traditionally sought a degree of independence from the central government. This, and other factors, caused major sections of the population to tolerate the insurgency and calling for expelling foreigners.
As a predator society, Afghanistan will take decades of peace to change their existing mindset. For centuries, Afghans have used their geographical crossroads location to live off the traders who passed through their territory.
Gen McChrystal said, “Nonetheless, the Afghan people expect appropriate governance, the delivery of basic services, and the provision of justice. While Afghan is rooted in tribal structures and ethnic identities, Afghans do have a sense of national identity. The population can also be a source of strength and intelligence and provide resistance to the insurgency. Alternatively, they can often change sides and provide tacit or real support to the insurgents.”
He goes on to talk about “the weakness of state institutions, malafide actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and coalition’s own errors. Afghans do not trust the government or that they will provide their essential needs, such as security, justice, and basic services. This crisis of confidence, coupled with a distinct lack of economic and educational opportunity, has created fertile ground for the insurgency,” McChrystal had said.
On the other hand, he counted Taliban’s weaknesses as:
(1) The activity of criminal networks creating a pool of manpower, resources, and capabilities for insurgents contributes to a pervasive sense of insecurity among the people. A number of Afghan officials at all levels are reportedly complicit in these activities.
(2) Narcotics activity funding insurgent groups must be understood within the overall context of insurgent financing, substantial income coming from foreign donors as well as from other criminal activities within Afghanistan, such as smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. Some insurgent groups “tax” the local population through checkpoints and protection money.
(3) The insurgents are not invulnerable, they have exploitable shortcomings.
Like McChrystal, Petraeus believes that the Taliban after “having previously held power in Afghanistan and failed, popular enthusiasm for them appears limited as does their ability to spread viably beyond Pashtun areas. There is an opportunity to exploit the insurgents’ inability to mobilise public support”.
The key geographical objective of major insurgent groups appears to be Kandahar City and Khost province. The (so-called) Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years and there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing.
There are indications that the Haqqani Network (HQN) aims to eventually regain full control of its traditional bases in Khost, Paktia and Paktika, while Hizb-e-Islami Gulbaddin (HiG) maintains militant bases in Nangarhar, Nuristan and Kunar. All three insurgent groups require resources – mainly money and manpower.
The QST derives funding from the narcotics trade and external donors, HQN from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with Al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups, while HiG seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling routes in eastern Afghanistan.
Corruption has grown around Karzai like a fungus, engulfing almost every ministry and office. Confirming this, Kim Barker says, “This pervasive culture of graft is blamed for driving a wedge between Afghans and their government – even driving some towards the Taliban. For Afghans, corruption falls into three categories, (1) First is petty corruption by lower-level government employees who are looking out for their own survival, (2) Next is large-scale corruption, which is undertaken by ministers and relatives of top Afghan officials involved in lucrative international contracts or the drug trade, and the (3) last is what Karzai called Western-driven corruption, which begins with the foreign contractors who live conspicuously well in Kabul.”
“They subcontract out work to local Afghans, who then make their own subcontracts with other Afghans. The end result is that the bulk of every aid dollar is wasted. But this, at least by Western standards, is technically legal – a seeming loophole that many Afghans find absurd, if not hypocritical and offensive,” Barker said.
Afghanistan is dependant on Pakistan for nearly everything, either it comes from Pakistan or through Pakistan. While everyone blames Pakistan for “hosting” Taliban sanctuaries within the borders, they well know Pakistan has done all within its resources to curb this access, but are mostly unable to stop the two-way traffic across the Durand Line.
We have suffered grievously for it, and continue to do so in more ways than one. Afghanistan happens to be a core US interest presently, and even if US interests do not coincide with those of Afghanistan’s neighbours Iran and Pakistan, Washington has to come up with a viable exit strategy, soon.
While it may disagree with Pakistan on many issues, the US still finds it to be a pliable client state, therefore, it is far more comfortable dealing with Pakistan. For our part, our core interests do coincide with the US’ on some issues, where they diverge the chasm is really deep.
The US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue is therefore meant to narrow the gaps between the core interests of the two countries and establish a working relationship that allows the US to exit Afghanistan without the withdrawal being labelled a failure.
